UDS — customer deployment & hand-off

This is the customer hand-off page for deploying an SZL flagship as a signed UDS (Unified Delivery System / Defense Unicorns) payload. It mirrors the CUSTOMER_DEPLOYMENT_README shipped in uds-bundles. For the live multi-organ demo surface, see UDS — Unified Demo Surface.

Doctrine v11 LOCKED — 749/14/163 · kernel c7c0ba17 · Λ = Conjecture 1 · SLSA L1 honest · Section 889 = exactly 5 vendors.

30-second summary

SZL flagships ship as Zarf/UDS packages stored as OCI artifacts in GHCR. Each artifact is cosign-signed (keyless OIDC), carries a CycloneDX + SPDX SBOM, and emits DSSE Khipu receipts at runtime. Deploy into any UDS Core / k3d cluster, airgap-friendly. Receipt-key material is regenerable; rotation forks the Khipu DAG.

1 · Pull the OCI artifact

Container packages are published under ghcr.io/szl-holdings/<flagship>:

# Example: a11oy. Substitute sentra / amaru / rosie / killinchu as needed.
zarf package pull oci://ghcr.io/szl-holdings/a11oy:uds-v0.2.0

Honest note. GHCR publication is gated on the org "Read and write" workflow permission; at hand-off time some flagship images may be pending that founder action. Confirm the exact tag against the latest release assets.

2 · Verify the signature (cosign, keyless OIDC)

cosign verify ghcr.io/szl-holdings/a11oy:uds-v0.2.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp="^https://github.com/szl-holdings/" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer="https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"

This checks that the artifact was built by a szl-holdings GitHub Actions workflow via the OIDC issuer — no long-lived signing key. SBOMs are attached as release assets.

3 · Deploy on UDS

# UDS Core must be running first (k3d example):
uds deploy k3d-core
# Then deploy the flagship payload:
uds deploy oci://ghcr.io/szl-holdings/a11oy:uds-v0.2.0

4 · Helm hook — receipt-key flow

The flagship chart registers a pre-install / pre-upgrade Helm hook that provisions the DSSE receipt keypair into the cluster before the workload starts:

# values.yaml (excerpt)
receiptKey:
  algorithm: ed25519       # Ed25519 (not RSA) — post-quantum prep, smaller signatures
  rotation:
    enabled: true
    onRotate: fork-khipu   # rotating the keypair forks the Khipu DAG (auditable)

# templates/receipt-key-hook.yaml (excerpt)
metadata:
  annotations:
    "helm.sh/hook": pre-install,pre-upgrade
    "helm.sh/hook-weight": "-5"
    "helm.sh/hook-delete-policy": before-hook-creation

The hook generates (or rotates) the Ed25519 keypair, stores it as a Kubernetes Secret, and writes a rotation receipt into the Khipu chain. On rotation the DAG forks so historic receipts stay verifiable against the prior key.

5 · Airgap

UDS packages are self-contained (images + SBOM + signatures bundled). Pull on a connected host, transfer the .tar.zst, and uds deploy the local file — no registry egress required at the airgapped site.

Section 889 admission

Exactly 5 vendors are blocked at admission via a Pepr policy: Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, Dahua. No Iron Bank / FedRAMP / CMMC / SWFT / Mission Owner claims.

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Doctrine v11 LOCKED · 749/14/163 · kernel c7c0ba17 · Λ = Conjecture 1 · SLSA L1 honest